With the election of Barack Obama as president, the ceiling on the progressive political ambition of African-American politicians seemingly disintegrated. In the years prior to Obama's election, black candidates had already made substantial gains in winning federal political office.
For example, since redistricting for the 1992 election, African-Americans consistently have held around 40 seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, approaching the percentage of AfricanAmericans in the general population.
i But for African-American House members, winning and being reelected to that office has normally been the pinnacle of their political success. Although the House appears to be a stepping stone to the U.S. Senate, it has not been the case for AfricanAmerican House members. In fact, only three African-American House members have run for the Senate since passage of the 17 th Amendment, all since 1994, and none of the three were elected.
ii In general, African-American candidates have not been successful in getting elected to the U.S. Senate, with only three having won seats prior to Obama's election as president in
2008.
iii At no time during this period has the Senate had more than a single black member.
Yet, in general, the most established pathway to the Senate is through the U.S. House of Representatives. That pattern is not a new one. Since the enactment of the 17 th amendment, it has been rare for fewer than 30 senators to have prior House service. In the period since 1992, In particular, we are interested in the degree to which the explanations based directly on race and perceptions about race in American politics provide answers to these questions, as opposed to explanations based largely on factors independent of race. Is the strategic behavior of African-American House members and those who actively recruit Senate candidates such that they perceive that black Senate candidates are less likely to be successful than their non-black counterparts because of racial attitudes in the electorate or the racial composition of the electorate in the more populous statewide constituencies? Or do other factors either separate from race or more contextually linked to the race of House members who might consider Senate candidacies explain why few African-American House members have run for the Senate, and none has been elected.
In this paper we will explore some of these questions using data on and the analysis of House members and Senate elections from 1992-2008. In some instances we will apply empirical tests to address these questions, while in others data limitations will limit us to reasoned speculations. A later phase of this research project will also include interviews with African-American House members and other political elites to obtain their perspectives and reactions to the findings we present in this paper.
Despite the fact that so few African-American House members have run for the Senate and none has been elected, our results raise doubts about the existence of direct explanations based on race. In fact, although black House members are less likely to run for the Senate than non-black House members, the percentages that run for the Senate are low among both groups.
In addition, factors aside from race have a statistically significant relationship with the decision to run, including the how ideologically extreme the House members voting record is, the population of the state, and an indicator of the House member's ability to raise campaign funds.
As we will discuss, this does not mean that race is not a contextually relevant factor. In addition,
we present some preliminary examinations of variables explaining which House members win Senate nominations and which ones win general elections, although the limited number of African-American candidates and the failure of any of them to win Senate seats constrain the analyses.
Race, Political Ambition, and Bicameralism
Before turning to those analyses, we first want to place this research in framework of the existing literature on race and politics, progressive ambition, and bicameralism. These three strains of literature provide us with a framework within which to examine why so few AfricanAmerican House members become U.S. Senate candidates and why there have been so few African-American senators. Candidate emergence literature addresses potential candidate pools.
Political ambition literature and research on House to Senate movement attempts to explain who decides to advance his political office within a bicameral setting. Race and politics literature sheds light on the likelihood an African-American can win a high-profile statewide election.
African-American House members will not run if they do not envision themselves as potential successful Senate candidates, decide that the costs of giving up their House seats to run for Senate outweigh the potential benefits, or do not believe they can win a Senate election.
Candidate emergence literature attempts to identify potential candidate pools. Some of these studies examine the socioeconomic characteristics of politicians, arguing that factors such as occupation, economic status, and social standing make a potential candidate eligible for office (Matthews 1954; Czudnowski 1972) . These scholars argue that the potential for candidacy is biased in favor of overrepresented individuals. More scholarship has extended this reasoning to assert that potential candidates assess their chances of winning before deciding to enter a political race by looking at those who have been successful before, thus perpetuating the presence of the overrepresented (Kazee 1994; Stone and Maisel 2003 The scholarship on political ambition offers some clues to this seeming paradox.
Political ambition theory recognizes that political careers depend on the structural conditions of the political system (Eulau 1962) . These structural variables operate as a filter that discourages some politicians to move through the system and encourages others (Black 1972) .
Politicians, like other professionals, are conscious of opportunities for upward mobility (Hall and van Houweling 1995) . A politician exhibits progressive ambition when she seeks to acquire an office perceived as more important than the one she currently holds (Schlesinger 1966 Brace 1984 , Copeland 1989 , Francis 1993 , Maisel and Stone 1997 .
Not only do politicians' own career experiences affect candidacy decisions (Eulau 1962; Black 1972; Fowler and McClure 1989; Parker 2008) , but the experiences of others do as well.
Individuals consider the collective experiences of candidates in hundreds of elections over long periods of time when making their own decisions on whether to run for office (Canon 1990; Canon and Sousa 1992) . Belonging to a group that is typically excluded from successful candidacy may decrease one's likelihood to decide to run for office (Fox and Lawless 2005a In addition to assessing the relative success of others who run for office, candidates also assess the opportunity structure presented to them. The most common suppressor of progressive ambition is a lack of political opportunity (Schlesinger 1966) . Three conditions make it more likely a potential candidate will move from one office to another: similarity of functions, a shared political arena, and logic of electorates (Schlesinger 1966) . Most agree that variables such as state size, an individual member's past electoral experience, the size of his campaign fund, and whether an incumbent is running are key factors in a House member's decision to run for the Senate (Rohde 1979 , Brace 1984 Copeland 1989; Canon 1990; Francis 1993; Kiewiet and Seng 1993; Hall and van Houweling 1995 Research on career patterns has demonstrated that the elements of candidacy decision calculus is the same regardless of race (Canon, Schousen, and Sellers 1996) . Yet even among African-Americans who are part of the same potential candidate pool as whites, those AfricanAmericans are significantly less likely to consider running for office (Fox and Lawless 2005b) .
This suggests that there is a barrier to black candidacy that whites do not face, and that the importance of each factor in candidacy decision-making may vary with race.
Underlying both the candidate emergence and the political ambition literature is the presence of a potential candidate's perception of her chances of winning. The more a politician risks by running, the greater his probability of winning must be in order for him to run (Black 1972; Jacobson and Kernell 1981 (Menifeld and Jones 2001) or have argued that differences in black electoral success cannot be attributed to differences in black population size (Grofman and Handley 1989) .
Clearly there is uncertainty among scholars as to how voters respond to AfricanAmerican candidates and it is not unreasonable to assume that African-American candidates themselves may be uncertain as to their chances for electoral success. When asked winning statewide office, former Governor L. Douglas Wilder of Virginia, the nation's only elected black governor at that time, stated "It is not only important for the black candidate to be as qualified as his white counterpart, but, as older generation blacks like to say, in most cases, you have to be twice as good as your white competitor if you hope to stand a chance" (Jeffries 1999) . If this is the case, even though African-American House members have already demonstrated an ability to win an election and to hold an office commonly thought to be a stepping stone to the Senate, they may not be as successful as white candidates in a statewide election for the U.S. Senate.
Thus, the literature in these various sub-fields creates potentially competing explanations for the differential frequency and success of black and non-black House members in pursuing Senate seats. Our efforts reported below are an attempt to examine these and other competing explanations and to test the validity of race and non-race explanations of the different rates of black and non-black House members in running for the Senate and the success of those who do run.
The Decision to Seek a Senate Nomination
In our central investigation, we theorize that the decision of a House member to seek a Senate Nomination is a function of member-demographic, career-specific, and strategic factors.
Member Demographics: Race and Gender
To the degree that black House members and those involved in encouraging the members to seek Senate seats perceive that racial attitudes in the electorate will reduce the probability of African-American Senate candidates being successful, we should expect black House members to be less likely to pursue Senate seats than their non-black counterparts. There is some support for this view in the existing literature. For example, because of racial considerations, Robert
Singh considers the House of Representatives to generally be the apex of political careers for most African-Americans House Members:
… race also plays a key role in cutting short the political ambitions of black members in that there is-invariably-nowhere else for them to go. Insofar as political ambition plays a critical role in the strategic decisions of American politicians to contest a House seat, to stand for reelection. Or instead to try to move on to other elective offices, the horizons of most black members encounter racially bounded limits and deterrent (Singh 1998, 117) .
But with the increased success of African-American candidates, and especially the increased number of blacks winning House seats beginning in 1992, we may find that race by itself is no longer explains the reluctance of black House members to run for the Senate. On the other hand, the bivariate data in Table 1 show the black House members are less than half as likely as non-blacks to run for the Senate. Because the focus of our investigation regards the decision of African-American House members to seek a Senate nomination, we code House
Members as Black (1) and Non-Black (0).
In terms of gender, scholars find that quality female candidates have a similar probability of being elected to political office as men when they decide to run (Rule 1981 , Burrell 1992 , Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994 . However, research also finds that women tend to possess lower levels of political ambition and are less likely to consider running for political office (Constantini 1990 , Fox and Lawless 2004 , and Fulton et al 2006 . Similar to the experience of AfricanAmerican House members, quality female House members may not seek Senate seats because of lower levels of political ambition may prevent. Despite the reasonable probability of success once a woman decides to run for office, we hypothesize that female House members will be less likely to seek a Senate seat nomination in their respective states.
House Career:
Seniority
We expect the relationship between House seniority and the decision to seek a Senate nomination to be nonlinear. As House member seniority increases, we expect the probability that an individual seeks a Senate nomination to increase because of factors such as higher name recognition within the state, advantages of congressional office, and individual political ambition to rise to higher office (Kazee 1994) . However, we expect that there is a point where the privileges that come with increased seniority in the House of Representatives (i.e. committee assignment, party leadership positions) will decrease the probability that a House member decides to leave the House and seek a Senate Nomination. At some point, greater seniority increases the cost of giving up a House seat more than it increases the strategic possibility of winning the nomination and the general election. Thereafter, the probability of running for the Senate should decline.
General Election Vote Percentage
We expect the security of a House member's seat to play an important role in the decision to seek a Senate nomination (Jacobson and Kernell 1981, Carson 2005 
Campaign Receipts
An important factor in most candidate decisions to run for political office is the ability to finance a campaign. Swain found that Black members of Congress tend to raise less campaign funds than white House members (Swain 1997) . But Swain's findings are based on an earlier time period than ours when there were fewer African-American House members and only examine a small number of black and white House members. An inability to raise sufficient funds on the part of African-American House members could make a run for the Senate a more risky proposition. We expect that House members who have a record of raising higher levels of campaign funds will be more likely to run for nomination to the Senate. House members with a solid record of raising campaign funds may be more likely to garner contributions from individuals and PACs, and the members' past record of fund-raisers will likely aid in attracting more donors for a statewide election contest. We use campaign receipts from the previous House election to track a House member's ability to raise funds in the House.
Ideology
We have less clear expectations about the role of ideology in the decision of a House member to seek a Senate nomination. In terms of ideology, we are interested in the effect of ideological extremity on the decision of a House member to seek a Senate nomination, not ideological direction. Primary voters are typically considered to be more ideological extreme, than general election voter (Aldrich and Rhode 2001) . This fact may propel a more extreme House member to run in a Senate primary and seek the party's nomination. However, a more extreme House member might also judge his ideology and voting record as too extreme to garner a statewide majority. Similarly, an extreme member may believe these arguments could persuade potentially supportive primary voters to opt for a less extreme candidate. AfricanAmericans are generally more liberal than white House members (Gerber 1996) and this fact could present a barrier to achieving statewide office. To measure the effect of ideological extremity on the decision to seek a Senate nomination we use the absolute value of first dimension DW Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) .
Contextual Factors: State Size
For multiple reasons, we hypothesize that House members from larger population states with more congressional districts will be less likely to seek a Senate nomination. First, Senate races in larger states are usually more competitive than Senate races in smaller states (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) . Potential candidates calculate the strategic probabilities of winning an office from the product of the probability of getting the nomination times the probability of then winning the general election (Maisel and Stone 1997) . This calculation may be lower for Senate seats in populous states.
Second, potential candidates consider who else is running (Kazee 1994 
Strategic Considerations: Presence of an Incumbent
An important strategic consideration in the decision to run for office is the presence of an incumbent (Carson 2005 General election vote percentages raised in the House campaign for the previous term also fails to reach statistical significance. As expected, the variable for House seniority has a curvilinear affect on the decision to seek a Senate nomination. As House member approaches five terms, there is a 71 percent increase in the probability he will seek a Senate nomination (holding other variables at their mean). However, once a House member serves over five terms in the House, her probability of seeking a Senate nomination starts to decrease. Campaign receipts raised in the previous House election also increases the probability that a House member will seek a Senate nomination. If a House member has a record of raising substantial funds during her House career, this could serve as a reasonable indicator that she will be more likely to raise sufficient funds throughout a Senate contest. A two-standard deviation change in the amount of campaign receipts raised leads to a 53 percent increase in the probability that a House Member will seek a Senate nomination (holding other variables at their mean).
Also as expected, House members from smaller states are more likely to run for Senate nomination than House members from states with more congressional districts. We did not have a clear directional expectation for the effect of ideological extremity on the decision of a House member to run for the Senate. Although primary contests tend to attract more ideological voters, our model indicates that less ideologically extreme House members are more likely to seek a Senate nomination. Possibly, more moderate House members may seek Senate nomination if they feel that can attract a more diverse range of voters support across the state than ideological extreme House members. Finally, the presence of an incumbent and an incumbent of the same party both decrease the probability that a House member will decide to seek a Senate nomination.
Discussion
One is tempted to conclude from the analysis on Table 2 Table 2 show that members with more extreme DW-Nominate scores are less likely to run for the Senate. When we examine the mean scores for black and non-black House members in Table 3 , we find that black House members' scores are more extreme, averaging .115 higher than non-blacks. This fits with the conventional wisdom that most African-American House members are among the more liberal members of that chamber. At least one leading AfricanAmerican former House member gave as his first explanation for so few black House members seeking Senate seat the claim that they were too liberal. The data in Table 3 support that claim.
Voting records, however, may also reflect the constituent preferences in the districts that The variable for seniority achieves statistical significance and still performs in a curvilinear fashion, but does so in the opposite direction as in the model for House members who seek a Senate nomination. In the Senate nomination win model, as seniority increases to approximately four House terms, the probability of winning a Senate nomination decreases. For a House member with more than four terms, probability of winning a Senate nomination increases slightly.
As with the decision to seek a Senate nomination, the presence of an incumbent and an incumbent of the same party reduces the probability that a House member will win the Senate nomination. The variables for gender and the absolute value of the DW nominate ideology score fail to reach statistical significance. The variable for campaign receipts from the prior House general election also fails to attain statistical significance. However, because candidates in larger states typically require more money in Senate contests, how much money raised in the House general elections may not be an appropriate indicator for who will win a Senate nomination.
House Members who win the Senate Seat Expectations
In the final model, we estimate the probability that a House member who has won his party's Senate nomination will go on to win the Senate Seat. For reasons stated in the model for
House members who win the Senate nomination, we do not have a clear directional expectation for the effect of gender on House members who have won a Senate nomination and run in the Senate general election contest. In order to factor in the political orientation of a state with an upcoming Senate election, we use the percentage of the two-party vote share received by the presidential candidate of the House member's party. We expect that as the two-party vote share received by the presidential candidate of the House member increases, the probability of success in the Senate general election increases.
We also expect campaign receipts raised in the House general election to increase the probability of success for House member in a Senate general election contests, whereas the House members from larger states and those facing incumbents are less likely to win a Senate seat. For ideology, one would typically expect that less ideological extreme House candidates would have an advantage when running for statewide office because the state populace is more likely to be ideological heterogeneous than the district populace. However, in our analysis of
House members who are running in the Senate general election we are working with a smaller sample of House members and thus have less ideological variance than in the previous models.
Therefore, we are unclear of the about the affect of ideological extremity on winning a Senate seat.
***TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE*** Results
Gender reaches statistical significance at the .1 level. Female House members are more likely to win a Senate seat after winning the Senate nomination. This finding comports with previous research which suggests that female candidates can be very successful when they make the decision to run for higher political office (Burrell 1992, Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994) . As expected, as the percentage of the two-party vote share received by the presidential candidate of the House member's party increases, the member's probability of winning the Senate seat increases. When an incumbent is in the Senate race, the probability of success for the House member decreases. Substantively, the presence of an incumbent decreases the probability of success by about 60 percent (with all other variables held constant at their mean). Unlike in the previous model for winning the Senate Nomination, campaign receipts raised in previous House general elections reaches statistical significance. But surprisingly an increase in campaign receipts raised in the House has a negative effect on the probability of a House member winning a Senate Seat. But as mentioned previously, because of the potential relationship between state size and the amount of funds needed to finance a Senate race, the amount of money raised a district race may not be an informative indicator or predictor of which House members are more likely to win a Senate seat.
Perhaps the most surprising finding is in regards to the effect of ideological extremity. In the first model which estimated the probability of running for a Senate nomination, more 
Conclusion
One of the benefits of a bicameral legislature such as the U.S. Congress is that the lower chamber can serve as a recruiting ground to the higher chamber for politically ambitious Much research that focuses on African-Americans in Congress has discussed the issues of descriptive representation (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996 , Swain 1993 , Tate 2004 , with some researchers claiming that descriptive representation is necessary in the House of
Representatives to improve the substantive representation of the black populace (Lublin 1999) .
And one of the main ways the number of African-American House members has increased over the years is through the creation of majority-minority districts. It would appear that the existence of structural and contextual barriers that prevent African-American House members from progressing to the Senate would lend even greater support to increasing descriptive representation in the House to offset the lack of descriptive representation for African-Americans in the Senate. A similar situation exists with the state of California, where its structurally limited representation in the Senate, is partially offset with a large influence from 53 members in the House.
While our findings show that African-American House members face many barriers to the U.S. Senate beyond the potential problem of racially biased voting, we do not believe increase of African-American in the U.S. Senate is impossible. However, for politically ambitious African-Americans, the proper stepping stone to the U.S. Senate does not appear to be the U.S. House of Representatives.
We consider our work a preliminary effort towards understanding the lack of progression of African-American House members to the Senate. The next step we intend to take towards answering our research question is to speak with African-American House members directly and ask them why they think most African-American House members choose not to seek Senate nominations. Although our work is directed towards African-American politicians in relations to the Senate, future research can also continue to explore the lack of African-Americans in the governor's office across the country and what role contextual and structural variables play in preventing ascension to statewide office. 
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